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The Metaphorical Bridge  
Between Law and Religion 
John Witte, Jr.* 
 
Abstract 
 
This Article explores the role of metaphors in shaping our thought 
and language in general, and in the fields of law and religion in 
particular.  Drawing on modern cognitive theorists like George 
Lakoff and Mark Johnson, the Article distinguishes and illustrates 
the roles of “orientation,” “structural,” and “ontological” meta-
phors in everyday life and language.  Drawing on jurists like Robert 
Cover and Steven Winter, it shows how metaphors work both in de-
scribing the law in terms like “the body,” and in prescribing the 
foundational beliefs and values on which the legal system depends.  
Finally, the Article explores the ample use of the number three in 
the law and speculates tentatively whether this legal appetite for 
“triads” might provide traction for the development of a Trinitarian 
jurisprudence.  This Article is dedicated to Robert Cochran, one of 
the pioneers of law and religion and Christian legal thought in the 
United States, whose own writings make ample use of metaphors. 
 
  
 
 * Robert W. Woodruff University Professor of Law; McDonald Distinguished Professor of Re-
ligion; and Director of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion, Emory University.  This Essay 
is adapted from a chapter I wrote on Law, Religion, and Metaphor, in RISIKO UND VERTRAUEN / RISK 
AND TRUST: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR MICHAEL WELKER ZUM 70. GEBURTSTAG 177–95 (Günter Thomas & 
Heike Springhart eds., 2017), and is used herein with permission of the publisher.  My thanks to Justin 
Latterell, Denise Wesley, Cai Roman—all colleagues in our Center for the Study of Law and Religion 
at Emory—for their helpful assistance.  © John Witte, Jr. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Bob Cochran likes metaphors.  In his path-breaking writings on the legal 
profession, he offers contrasting metaphors of “The Lawyer as Godfather,”1 
“The Lawyer as Hired Gun,”2 “The Lawyer as Guru,”3 “The Lawyer as 
Friend,”4 and “The Lawyer as Nostromo,” the name of Joseph Conrad’s “hon-
orable” protagonist.5  Against the popular image of the lawyer as grubby, 
greedy, and adversarial, he sets out the classic ideal of the law as a “noble” 
profession6 charged with leading a “communitarian” system7 of justice and 
mercy, law, and love.8  He calls for a “collaborative practice”9 of law, built on 
a striking new legal beatitude: “Blessed are the Compromisers.”10  For the 
legal profession to achieve this ideal, Cochran offers yet another metaphor, 
this time drawn from Thomas Shaffer, his late great mentor and coauthor: 
Shaffer envisions a downtown street.  On one side of the street is a 
house of worship; on the other is a courthouse.  According to Shaffer, 
law schools train lawyers to look at the religious congregation from 
the courthouse—that is, to analyze the problems that the religious 
congregation creates for the law.  Law schools ignore the possibility 
that there might be a view of the courthouse from the house of wor-
 
 1. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND MORAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 5 (2d ed. 2009). 
 2. Id. at 15, 16. 
 3. Id. at 30. 
 4. Id. at 40, 42. 
 5. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Honor as a Deficient Aspiration for “The Honorable Profession”: The 
Lawyer as Nostromo, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 859, 863 (2000). 
 6. Id. at 859–60 (discussing lawyers’ concerns with the noble aspects of law). 
 7. ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR. & ROBERT M. ACKERMAN, LAW AND COMMUNITY: THE CASE OF 
TORTS 223 (2004).  
 8. See generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Jesus, Agape, and Law, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW: 
HOW MIGHT CHRISTIAN LOVE SHAPE LAW? 36, 37 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Zachary R. Calo eds., 
2017) (collecting essays on how Christian love, or agape, could inform legal systems). 
 9. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Can the Ordinary Practice of the Law be a Religious 
Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373, 378 (2005). 
 10. See generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Introduction: Blessed are the Compromisers?, 38 PEPP. 
L. REV. 813, 815 (2011) (giving introductory material on the virtue of compromise in law and reli-
gion). 
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ship—that the law might create problems for the religious congrega-
tion. 
Prophetic witness is discounted in law teaching.  Our part of the 
academy, more than any other, has systematically discouraged 
and disapproved of invoking the religious tradition as important 
or even interesting.  It ignores the community of the faithful so 
resolutely that even its students who have come to law school 
from the community of the faithful learn to look at [the religious 
congregation] from the courthouse, rather than at the courthouse 
from [the religious congregation]. 
Shaffer encourages lawyers to “walk across the street and look at the 
courthouse from the church.”11 
This provocative image points to Professor Cochran’s equally important 
work in law and religion.  This work is reflected in his many leading publica-
tions, the excellent programs and projects he has regularly convened for the 
Nootbaar Institute at Pepperdine, and his intense collaborative work with 
Christian lawyers, law professors, and law students at home and abroad over 
several decades.  This work, too, is peppered with metaphors.  Some are fa-
miliar biblical terms and tropes: The law “written on our hearts”;12 the “habits 
of the heart”;13 “the race is not to the swift”;14 “all who take the sword will 
perish by the sword”;15 “there is nothing new under the sun”;16 a voice “crying 
 
 11. FAITH & LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW AMERICAN 
LAW 1 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., 2008) (quoting THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 209–10, 214 (1991)).  
 12. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Catholic Court Appeal: Why So Many Catholic Justices on the 
Supreme Court? Why Now?, TOUCHSTONE, July–Aug. 2006, at 40, 42; see also LAW AND THE BIBLE: 
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 14–15, 155 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & David VanDrunen 
eds., 2013) [hereinafter LAW AND THE BIBLE]. 
 13. Cochran, supra note 12, at 42. 
 14. Robert F. Cochran, Jr, Modern Legal Traditions: The United States, in 2 OXFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE BIBLE AND LAW 88, 94 (Brent A. Strawn ed., 2015) (quoting Ecclesiastes 9:11 
(New King James Version)). 
 15. Id. (quoting Matthew 26:52). 
 16. Id. (quoting Ecclesiastes 1:9).  See also the use of Ecclesiastes in Robert F. Cochran, Jr., In-
troduction: Can the Ordinary Practice of Law Be a Religious Calling?, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 373, 376 
(2005).  
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in the wilderness”;17 “the letter kills, but the Spirit gives life”;18 and the doc-
trine of “Good Samaritan[ism].”19  Some of these metaphors are the familiar 
currency of civil society and political theology: the law of “intermediary as-
sociations,”20 “subsidiarity,”21 “sphere sovereignty,”22 the “pillars of the 
church”23 and society, and the contrasting norms and ends of “agape versus 
eros.”24 
Cochran uses a particularly compelling architectural metaphor to describe 
the shifts away from biblical and other forms of “higher law” and justice in 
modern legal education: 
 When I was a law student at the University of Virginia in the mid-
1970s, my jurisprudence professor Calvin Woodard used the law 
school’s architecture to illustrate the twentieth century’s major juris-
prudential shift.  Above the columns at the entrance to Clark Hall, 
where I spent my first year of law school, carved in stone was the 
statement: “That those alone may be servants of the law who labor 
with learning, courage, and devotion to preserve liberty and promote 
justice.” 
 From the front, we walked into a massive entry hall, adorned on 
 
 17. Cochran, Modern Legal Traditions, supra note 14, at 94 (quoting Mark 1:3; Luke 3:4; John 
1:23; Isaiah 40:3). 
 18. Id. (quoting 2 Corinthians 3:6). 
 19. Robert M. Ackerman & Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Law, Community, and Personal Injury, 
RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY, Spring–Summer 2004, at 77, 81–82. 
 20. See Cochran, supra note 12, at 43. 
 21. See id.; see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme Court Justices: A 
Theological Analysis, 41 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296, 304–07 (2006) (discussing “subsidiarity” and 
“sphere sovereignty”). 
 22. See generally Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Tort Law and Intermediate Communities: Calvinist and 
Catholic Insights, in CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT 486 (Michael W. McConnell, 
Robert F. Cochran, Jr. & Angela C. Carmella eds., 2001) (discussing the application of “intermediate 
communitarian” theory to tort law, which is largely individualistic).  
 23. Cochran, supra note 16, at 374. 
 24. See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Agape, Gift, and Intellectual Property, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND 
LAW, supra note 8, at 273, 284–85 (discussing the concept of agape, rather than eros, storge, or philia, 
in intellectual-property law); Linda Ross Meyer, Agape, Humility, and Chaotic Good: The Challenge 
and Risk of Allowing Agape a Role in the Law, in AGAPE, JUSTICE, AND LAW, supra note 8, at 57, 63–
70 (exploring how different types of love, including agape and eros, might be implemented in a legal 
system). 
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either side with murals.  On one side was Moses presenting the Ten 
Commandments to the Israelites.  On the other was what appeared to 
be a debate in a Greek public square.  As we gazed up at the larger-
than-life figures, they seemed to represent the higher aspirations of 
the law.  During my second year in law school, we moved to a much 
more modern, efficient building known then as “no-name hall,” some 
distance from the rest of the University.  The statement that had been 
above the entrance to Clark Hall was placed on a modest plaque at 
the entrance to the new building.  Small pictures of the murals were 
placed in the lobby.  (It is my understanding that a new addition to 
the law school includes copies of the statement and the mural which 
split the size difference.) 
 Mr. Woodard (we always used “Mr.” at the University of Vir-
ginia) noted wistfully that few contemporary legal philosophers 
would have thought that the aspirations for law or lawyers conveyed 
in the motto above the entrance made sense any longer.  Such claims 
were nostalgic remnants of Blackstone’s era.  Legal philosophy had 
followed Oliver Wendell Holmes, who defined law as merely 
“prophesies of what the courts will do in fact” and said, “I hate jus-
tice, which means that I know that if a man begins to talk about that, 
for one reason or another he is shirking thinking in legal terms.”  
Holmes argued that there is no higher law.  Law is merely the asser-
tion of power down here.  Despite changing views of law, I don’t 
believe that any law school has chosen to place Justice Holmes’s “I 
hate justice” statement above its entryway.25 
It has been a joy for me over the years to work with and learn from Pro-
fessor Cochran.  We were in the early vanguard of law professors who felt 
called to try to set out the metes and bounds of a new field of law and religion 
study, and to begin breaking some of the first rows.  This field now attracts a 
substantial guild of some 1500 scholars around the globe26—not only law pro-
 
 25. Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Is There a Higher Law? Does It Matter? Introduction, 36 PEPP. L. REV. 
(SPECIAL ISSUE) i, i–ii (2009) (internal citations omitted). 
 26. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND RELIGION xii, xviii (Rex Ahdar ed., 2018).  See generally 
id. (collecting essays on the legal issues arising from the interaction between the state and religious 
communities and individuals). 
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fessors, but also scholars of religion, ethics, history, philosophy, political sci-
ence, anthropology, and other disciplines.27  These scholars are studying “the 
religious dimensions of law, the legal dimensions of religion, and the interac-
tion of legal and religious ideas and institutions, methods and practices—his-
torically and today,” in the West and well beyond.28  They believe that at a 
fundamental level, religion gives law its spirit and inspires its adherence to 
ritual, tradition, and justice.  Law gives religion its structure and encourages 
its devotion to order, organization, and orthodoxy.  Law and religion share 
such ideas as fault, obligation, and covenant, and such methods as ethics, rhet-
oric, and textual interpretation.  Law and religion also balance each other by 
counterpoising justice and mercy, rule and equity, discipline and love.  It is 
this dialectical interaction that gives these two disciplines and two dimensions 
of life their vitality and their strength.  Without law at its backbone, religion 
slowly crumbles into shallow spiritualism.  Without religion at its heart, law 
gradually crumbles into empty, and sometimes brutal, formalism.29 
This Article—dedicated to Professor Cochran in friendship and frater-
nity—builds on his efforts in exploring the role of metaphor theory as a new 
way of bridging the fields of law and religion.  This is a rather new topic for 
me, and I must confess that much of the high-flying metaphor theory in print 
is several octaves above my usual low pitch as a legal historian.  Hence these 
necessarily preliminary and experimental thoughts below.30 
II. METAPHORS AND MEANING 
Modern cognitive theorists have shown that our conceptual thought and 
everyday speech are riddled with metaphors that help us to make sense of our 
 
 27. See, e.g., LEADING WORKS IN LAW AND RELIGION (Russell Sandberg ed., 2019) (examining 
the personal and social impact of leading British works in the field of law and religion). 
 28. RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 26, at xii. 
 29. Id.; see JOHN WITTE, JR., GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE: LAW AND RELIGION IN THE WESTERN 
TRADITION 26 (2006) [hereinafter WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE]; John Witte, Jr., The Study 
of Law and Religion in the United States: An Interim Report, 14 ECCLESIASTICAL L.J. 327 (2012). 
 30. I have been discussing this topic with my friend and colleague, Rafael Domingo, and have 
benefitted greatly from his recent monograph, RAFAEL DOMINGO, GOD AND THE SECULAR LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2016), and his article, Rafael Domingo, Body, Soul, and Spirit of the Law: Towards a Ho-
listic Legal Paradigm, 7 OXFORD J.L. & RELIGION 230 (2018) [hereinafter Domingo, Body, Soul, and 
Spirit of the Law]. 
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experiences.31  The metaphors they have in mind are not only the clever im-
ages, similes, fictions, and analogies of the poets and playwrights: “the Ship 
of State,”32 “your mind is a machine,”33 “time heals all wounds,”34 “necessity 
is the mother of invention,” and  “thou hast cleft my heart in twain.”35  Nor do 
they mean just the colloquialisms of common speech: “I smell a rat” or “that 
idea stinks.”  These kinds of word games are everywhere in our language and 
have long been recognized.  Modern cognitive theorists are interested not just 
in these word games but also in the metaphors that run deeper, sometimes 
unseen, yet shape our thought and language.36  “The essence of metaphor is 
understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another,” noted 
cognitive theorists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in their path-breaking 
study Metaphors We Live By.37 
A. Orientation and Structural Metaphors 
Some of these are what cognitive theorists call orientation metaphors.38  
Think of how much conceptual and linguistic work we do with the simple 
spatial image of up and down.  “Up” is generally more positive, “down” more 
negative in our mind and speech: “Things are looking up”; “Thumbs up”; “We 
hit our peak last year”; “I’m feeling up today”; “I’m in high spirits”; “That 
boosted my spirits”; “My spirits rose.”  By contrast: “I’m feeling down”; “My 
spirits sank”; “I’m really low”; “I’m depressed”; I’m in a rut”; “It has all been 
downhill of late”; “Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of 
death.”39  We draw the same set of contrasts with other spatial images.  Think 
 
 31. See generally PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: THE CREATION OF MEANING IN 
LANGUAGE (Robert Czerny trans., 2003) (studying metaphor in linguistic, semantic, rhetorical, and 
hermeneutical modes). 
 32. PLATO’S REPUBLIC, Bk. VI, 487e. 
 33. See John C. Marshall, Minds, Machines and Metaphors, 7 SOC. STUD. SCI. 475, 483 (1977) 
(discussing the truth behind the “mind is a machine” metaphor). 
 34. Michael J. A. Wohl & April L. McGrath, The Perception of Time Heals All Wounds: Temporal 
Distance Affects Willingness to Forgive Following an Interpersonal Transgression, 33 PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1023, 1032 (2007) (identifying “time heals all wounds” as an axiom). 
 35. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET, act 3, sc. 4. 
 36. See, e.g., Gerard Steen, The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor—Now New and Improved!, 9 
REV. OF COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 26, 27 (2011) (discussing “new” contemporary theory of metaphor). 
 37. GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 5 (1980) (italics in original 
removed). 
 38. Id. at 14–22. 
 39. Psalms 23:4 (New American Standard Bible). 
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of “front–back,” “on–off,” “in–out,” “near–far,” “center–edge,” and how 
much they coat our thought and speech.  We do the same thing with other 
kinds of common contrasts in nature: “light–dark,” “day–night,” “summer–
winter,” and more.  It’s “the winter of our discontent [m]ade glorious sum-
mer”40—not the other way around.  All these orientation metaphors allow us 
to tie our language and thought to common objects of our experience.41 
Some of our language and thought is also shaped by deeper structural 
metaphors.42  These kinds of metaphors do more conceptual work, but often 
more subtly, sometimes subconsciously.  Lakoff and Johnson give a good ex-
ample: “Argument is war.”43  That’s not something we normally say or hear 
in everyday speech—save perhaps in a tough crash course on negotiation, a 
military command center, or a bruising government budget battle.  Yet, this 
structural metaphor quietly produces all kinds of common images in our mind 
and turns of phrase in our everyday speech about arguments: 
Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I’ve never won an argument with him. 
You disagree?  Okay shoot. 
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you out. 
He shot down all of my arguments.44 
Obviously, an argument is not a form of war.  But the concept of an argu-
ment is “metaphorically structured, the activity is metaphorically structured, 
and, consequently, the language is metaphorically structured” as a war.45 Once 
the structural metaphor, “argument is war,” gets pointed out, it’s easy to see 
how it shapes our everyday language and habits of thought.  And, once ex-
plored and illustrated, the metaphor might well bring nods of approval by 
some—say, a hard-nosed litigator whose livelihood depends on winning 
 
 40. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III act 1, sc. 1, ll. 1–2. 
 41. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 14–24. 
 42. Id. at 56–68. 
 43. Id. at 4. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 5–6. 
[Vol. 47: 435, 2020] The Metaphorical Bridge 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
444 
“courtroom battles.”  It may bring frowns to others, like psychologists, medi-
ators, or pastors, who use words to promote healing conversation or spiritual 
elevation.  For them, the image of “argument is war” and the common phrases 
it inspires impedes their cause.  They know that “fire away!” is not a good 
way to start a mediation or healing session.  But for many of us who are “just 
arguing” about mundane things in everyday life, we often subconsciously 
carry on with the linguistic artillery of warfare.  That might help explain a bit 
why we sometimes can’t stop the argument until we “win”; losers in “war” 
rarely fare well.  But, the metaphor itself—“argument is war”—often remains 
hidden, unacknowledged, while it quietly shapes our everyday thought and 
language. 
Take another example of a structural metaphor: “Time is money.”  This 
metaphor, too, spins off all kind of habits of thought and speech we use every 
day: 
You’re wasting my time. 
This gadget will save you hours. 
I don’t have the time to give you. 
How do you spend your time these days? 
That flat tire cost me an hour. 
I’ve invested a lot of time in her. 
I don’t have enough time to spare for that. 
You’re running out of time. 
You need to budget your time. 
Put aside some time for ping pong. 
Is that worth your while? 
Do you have much time left? 
He’s living on borrowed time. 
You don’t use your time profitably. 
I lost a lot of time when I got sick. 
Thank you for your time.46 
In this metaphor, we’ve taken something infinite—time—and have not 
only divided it, but commodified it into something limited, valuable, and cal-
culable.47  In a Western services market, this is a good way to do our billing 
 
 46. Id. at 6–7. 
 47. See id. at 8 (explaining how modern Western culture’s notion of work developed the meta-
phorical understanding of time’s calculability in terms of money). 
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and accounting, and it certainly helps to schedule appointments and airlines.  
But, the reality is that the “time is money” metaphor, at least in the West, has 
saturated our everyday speech, even when quantifying or calculating hours 
and minutes is not important or is counterproductive.  Contrast that Western 
metaphor of “time is money,” say, to the images of the Taliban in Afghanistan 
who say that “time is a gift” and declare defiantly to the occupying American 
forces: “You have the watches.  We have the time.”48 
The “time is money” metaphor brings to mind all kinds of other meta-
phors of the market and the economy that pepper and spice our speech: “Labor 
is capital”; “Markets must be free”; “Every man has his price”; and “It’s a 
dog-eat-dog world out there.”  Even in the world of economics that deals in 
hard numbers and exact calculus, metaphors are hard at work shaping our 
thought and language.  We anthropomorphize the market into an agent and 
object and describe its activities with our familiar orientation metaphors of up 
and down: “The market fell today”; “The Dow plummeted”; “Coke inched 
back up”; “GM fought its way back;” or, “NASDAQ leaped forward.”  We 
root for the market as if we were watching our children from the sidelines of 
a ballgame—having “invested” in both.  Sometimes we make the market an 
object, often a victim of the actions of others: “That new regulation just stran-
gled the market”;49 “The dollar’s fall killed GM this quarter”; or, “The Fed’s 
lower interest rate gave the Dow new life.”  What’s interesting for our pur-
poses is that “the stock market is one [place] where communicators strive for 
practical precision rather than inspiring poetry,” but here, too, metaphors work 
subtly to shape our thought, language, and practice.50 
B. Ontological and Religious Metaphors 
Even deeper than orientation and structural metaphors are what cognitive 
theorists call ontological metaphors.51  These are more fundamental beliefs, 
 
 48. Sami Yousafzai, 10 Years of the Afghan War: How the Taliban Go On, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 2, 
2011), https://www.newsweek.com/10-years-afghan-war-how-taliban-go-68223. 
 49. See, e.g., David Sheppard & Myles McCormick, Cuadrilla Says UK Fracking Rules Risk 
‘Strangling’ It, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/cb36ad4e-dc5e-11e8-9f04-
38d397e6661c. 
 50. M.W. Morris et al., Metaphors and the Market: Consequences and Preconditions of Agent and 
Object Metaphors in Stock Market Commentary, 102 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION 
PROCESSES 174, 188 (2007). 
 51. LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 37, at 25–32. 
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values, and ideals that shape not only our thought and language but our whole 
intellectual and institutional orientation.  Sometimes these deep ontological 
metaphors are cast in poetic language:52 “Man is free, but everywhere in 
chains.”53  “These are the times that try men’s souls.”54  “The First Amend-
ment has erected a wall between church and state.”55  Or “law is the bulwark 
of freedom.”56  Sometimes these ontological metaphors are plainer statements 
but with no less meaning-making and institution-shaping power: “All men are 
created equal;” “No taxation without representation.”  “One man, one vote.” 
“Popular sovereignty.”  “Freedom!”57 
In politics, these deeper ontological metaphors—whether poetically or 
plainly stated—can become veritable articles of faith, which we cherish, even 
adore, which we fight for, even to death.58  During the American Revolution, 
these ontological metaphors were clearly stated as articles of faith grounded 
in “the Laws of Nature and Nature’s God.”59  “We hold these truths to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator 
with certain unalienable Rights.”60  These founding statements were eventu-
ally wrapped in bright patriotic colors and ceremonies, statues and songs that 
could not be missed as articles of a common political faith.  In the Cold War, 
they were recast as “spiritual weapons” in the struggle of “freedom versus 
communism,” “Godly America versus atheist Russia.”61  In the war on terror, 
they were pitched as a “crusade for freedom” against the “axis of evil,” the 
“clash of civilizations” between the West and the rest.62 
 
 52. See Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 37, at 13 (“[M]etaphorical concepts can be extended beyond 
the range of ordinary literal ways of thinking and talking into the range of what is called figurative, 
poetic, colorful, or fanciful thought and language.”). 
 53. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT, in ROUSSEAU: THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
AND OTHER LATER POLITICAL WRITINGS bk. 1, ch. 1, § 1, at 43 (Victor Gourevitch ed. & trans., 1997).  
 54. Thomas Paine, The American Crisis, in THOMAS PAINE, COLLECTED WRITINGS 91 (Eric Foner 
ed., 1995). 
 55. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing Twp., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). 
 56. MILNER S. BALL, LYING DOWN TOGETHER: LAW, METAPHOR, AND THEOLOGY 23 (1985). 
 57. See the collection of American founding statements in THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION, 5 vols. 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 58. See, e.g., Marchall Bidwell, Famous American War Songs, 25 ANNALS IOWA 174, 174–77 
(1944). 
 59. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 60. Id. para. 2. 
 61. See T. JEREMY GUNN, SPIRITUAL WEAPONS: THE COLD WAR AND THE FORGING OF AN 
AMERICAN NATIONAL RELIGION (2009). 
 62. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD 
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But ontological metaphors in politics, or in other fields, don’t have to be 
so high-flying, so obvious, so revolutionary to inspire followers, or to shape 
actions, allegiances, and institutional activities reflexively.  The great Ameri-
can church historian Martin Marty tells a funny but poignant story: 
[There was] an incident in which visitors came upon a tarred-and-
feathered refugee as he ran away from the up-in-arms citizenry of a 
small town.  Asked what had led him to this terrible treatment, he 
declared that an argument had arisen about the Monroe Doctrine and 
his attitude toward it . . . .  [H]e said he believed in the Monroe Doc-
trine, he lived by the Monroe Doctrine, he would die for the Monroe 
Doctrine; he just did not know what was in it.63 
The point is that it’s not just soldiers, duty-bound to obey commands, 
whose activities and attitudes can be reflexively shaped by ontological meta-
phors that express deep ideals of “freedom,” “democracy,” or “patriotism.”  
It’s often the followers, the crowds, who will join a cause reflexively, often 
knowing little more than the guiding maxim, the statement of belief, the on-
tological metaphor of the movement to spur them to dramatic action.  “Cor-
porations are greedy” was enough to stoke the WTO riots and Occupy Wall 
Street movement.64  “Management is corrupt” has inspired many a labor 
strike.  “Save the rainforest” brings out the greens and greenbacks by the mil-
lions.  It does not always matter whether these claims are true, verified, ra-
tional, or justified.  Often, their mere statement is enough to spur allegiance 
and action among many. 
As these examples illustrate, ontological metaphors run deeper than struc-
tural metaphors.  “Deeper” in the sense that they don’t just subtly shape 
thoughts and words, they also inspire attitudes and actions of greater magni-
 
ORDER (2011). 
 63. Martin E. Marty, Foreword to 1 THE TEACHINGS OF MODERN CHRISTIANITY ON LAW, 
POLITICS, AND HUMAN NATURE xv, xvi (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2006) (citing 
D.W. BROGAN, THE AMERICAN CHARACTER 130 (1944)). 
 64. See, e.g., John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening, WASH. POST (Dec. 
1, 1999), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/WPcap/1999-12/01/089r-120199-idx.html (re-
porting that anti-trade protesters delayed the opening of the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) by 
blocking access to the location where the WTO conference was to be held while “[s]houting slogans 
about greedy corporations and damage to the environment”). 
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tude.  “Deeper” in that they sometimes concern fundamental or ultimate be-
liefs or values in life, things for which people make ample sacrifices of time, 
talent, and treasure—things that people will die for.  “Deeper” in that these 
ontological metaphors sometimes command major allegiances and alli-
ances—literally, on the battlefields and streets, and virtually, in the commu-
nities of ideas and the conversations that gather around them.  Ontological 
metaphors do not just orient experiences and emotions in time and space—as 
in, “I’m feeling down.”  Nor do they simply map one observed phenomenon 
onto another—as in “argument is war” or “time is money.”  Instead, they are 
more-or-less conscious linguistic expressions of deeper truths, higher values, 
and unseen realities that structure human life and understanding. 
Viewed at this deeper level, ontological metaphors can become like reli-
gious metaphors.  Not all ontological metaphors are religious.  But, an onto-
logical metaphor—and the attitudes and actions, allegiances and alliances it 
inspires—becomes religious if it is based on subjective beliefs and assump-
tions about the underlying features of experience and reality, and if it involves 
a cognitive leap, an act of trust or reliance that goes beyond immediate sense 
experience or the experimentally replicable procedures of science.  In taking 
this leap or relying on this hunch, it takes on the character of faith, becoming 
at least quasi-religious.  Often this is done when, say, Marxism, market capi-
talism, liberal democracy, cultural individualism, or therapeutic ideologies 
provide life orientations and directions for individuals and groups.65  The on-
tological metaphor becomes more fully religious in character when it gets ex-
pressed in and through ceremonies and rituals, statements of belief, canons of 
conduct, and communities of followers—as we see in some modern forms of 
secular nationalism. 
To call these ontological metaphors “religious” or “quasi-religious” is not 
to deprecate or defame them.  It is rather to show that they shape persons’ and 
communities’ attitudes and actions, allegiances and alliances much like reli-
gious metaphors shape the same in Christians and other religious believers.  
“[P]rofit is the measure of right”66 is no less a galvanizing creedal statement 
than “Do unto others as you would have done unto you.”67  “Man is free” 
shapes allegiances and alliances as much as “God is sovereign.”  “Marriage is 
 
 65. For a fuller discussion of this view of religious metaphors, see DON S. BROWNING & TERRY 
D. COOPER, RELIGIOUS THOUGHT AND THE MODERN PSYCHOLOGIES 21–30, 106–43, 203–09 (2d ed. 
2004). 
 66. THOMAS HOBBES, DE CIVE OR THE CITIZEN 28 (Sterling P. Lamprecht ed., 1949). 
 67. See Luke 6:31. 
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a mere contract” is no less a fundamental statement of belief and value than 
“marriage is a sacrament.”68 
With this broad understanding of metaphor as our guide, we can see that 
many schools of thought and action and many cognitive activities are religious 
or quasi-religious in character.  They build on and produce faith-like commit-
ments about the most determinative context of experience and either imply or 
are further animated by storylines about the whence and whether of reality as 
a whole.69  Political historians and philosophers have long shown how modern 
nationalism is a form of secular religion rooted in deep political metaphors.70  
This same phenomenon can be seen in the world of ideas.  In Evolution as a 
Religion, Mary Midgley shows how many scientists and other academics em-
brace the metaphor of evolution not only as an explanatory concept but also a 
quasi-religious belief about the origin and nature of reality.71  For them, old-
fashioned talk of a “creation order,” “natural law,” or “teleological structure” 
is not just unscientific, but anathema, a form of irrationality to be exorcised 
from the academy.  In Economics as Religion, Robert Nelson exposes the 
faith-like economic beliefs and actions of various rational-choice, behavioral, 
and institutional economics schools at work today.72  Among some econo-
mists, Nelson shows, “cost-benefit analysis” is as devout a belief and liturgical 
an activity as praying for “our daily bread.”73  Similarly, in Religious Thought 
and the Modern Psychologies, Don Browning and Terry Cooper have exposed 
 
 68. See JOHN WITTE, JR., FROM SACRAMENT TO CONTRACT: MARRIAGE, RELGION, AND LAW IN 
THE WESTERN TRADITION 77–112, 287–324 (2d ed. 2012). 
 69. See, e.g., Clifford Geertz, Religion as a Cultural System, in THE INTERPRETATION OF 
CULTURES (1973), at 90 (defining religion as “(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish 
powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions 
of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that 
(5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic”). 
 70. ERNST CASSIRER, THE MYTH OF THE STATE (C.W. Hendel trans., 1946); see also HAROLD J. 
BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993) (on the role of 
secular nationalism in the modern revolutions).  See further discussion of Berman, infra notes 93–96 
and accompanying text. 
 71. See generally MARY MIDGLEY, EVOLUTION AS A RELIGION: STRANGE HOPES AND STRANGER 
FEARS (2d ed. 2003) (arguing that evolutionary theory has become quasi-religious, in the sense that it 
is a “secular faith” that is “serving as a religion”). 
 72. See generally ROBERT H. NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION: FROM SAMUELSON TO CHICAGO 
AND BEYOND (2001) [hereinafter NELSON, ECONOMICS AS RELIGION] (arguing, through historical 
analysis, that economics has taken on a religious character in the United States); ROBERT H. NELSON, 
REACHING FOR HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE THEOLOGICAL MEANING OF ECONOMICS (1991). 
 73. NELSON, ECONOMICS AND RELIGION, supra note 72. 
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the quasi-religious metaphors that animate the major modern psychologies.74  
Deep metaphors of life against death, harmony, care, and teleological design 
anchor their thought, and inspire major schools of psychological thought and 
therapeutic service that still operate all over the West and well beyond.75 
III. METAPHORS AND THE LAW 
Having seen orientation, structural, ontological, and even quasi-religious 
metaphors at work in many other fields of study—even technical fields like 
science and economics—it should come as no surprise to find metaphors at 
work in law, too.  Despite its popular reputation for being bound by neutral 
logic, exacting reason, and scientific rigor, law is in fact filled with metaphor-
ical reasoning and rhetoric.76  And the legal system as a whole rests on deep 
ontological metaphors that reflect fundamental beliefs and subjective values 
of the people and their rulers. 
A. Orientation and Structural Metaphors 
A number of metaphors at work in the law are orientation and structural 
metaphors.  Many of them are based on personifications of the law, metaphors 
mapped onto the body and its parts.  Jurists speak of the “body,” the “corpus” 
of the law—the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the Corpus Iuris Canonici, the Corpus 
Iuris Hibernici.77  This “body” of the law is sometimes depicted in a gendered 
way as “Lady Justice”—Justitia and Dike, the ancient Romans and Greeks 
called her, respectively and respectfully.78  The law, jurists say, has both an 
“anatomy” and a “physiology”—a structure and form as well as a process, 
 
 74. BROWNING & COOPER, supra note 65. 
 75. See generally id. (comparing religious thought to metaphors of death, harmony, care, and tel-
eological design throughout). 
 76. Jonathan K. Van Platten, Metaphors and Persuasion, 58 S.D. L. REV. 295, 298 (2013) (“Be-
cause metaphors are widely used in the law, there is already a substantial amount of discussion of 
metaphor in legal scholarship.”); see Jennie Bricker, Strike That! Metaphors of the Law, 76 OR. ST. B. 
BULL., July 2016, at 27. 
 77. For background and examples regarding the “body” of the law, see Peter Landau, ‘Aequitas’ 
in the ‘Corpus Iuris Canonici’, 20 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 95, 95 (1994); Alan Watson, Justin-
ian’s Corpus Iuris Civilis: Oddities of Legal Development, and Human Civilisation, 1 J. COMP. L. 461, 
461 (2006). 
 78. See, e.g., Randy Kennedy, That Lady with the Scales Poses for Her Portraits, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/books/16justice.html. 
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procedure, and proper way of functioning.79  It also has a “heart,” “soul,” and 
“spirit”—reflected in the concern for both the letter and spirit of the law.80  
The law “embodies” important principles like “due process,” into which are 
further “incorporated” (from corpus, Latin for “body”) various rights in the 
Bill of Rights.81  The body of the law grows, matures, and senesces; some of 
its members eventually die and become “dead letters.”  But even then, some 
of these dead members “long buried,” like the old forms of actions at English 
common law, “still rule us from their graves.”82 
Citizens and subjects are “bound” by the law, and the private contracts 
made between parties are likewise “binding.”  Criminals “break” the law, 
“harm” the “body politic,” and “tear the social fabric.”  Thus “the long arm of 
the law” reaches out to bring them to justice.  An important new case is a 
“seminal” case.  The later cases it “spawns” are its “progeny.”  Constitutional 
courts “strike” down statutes “on their face.”  Corporations are “legal bodies,” 
“fictitious persons,” capable of “corporate speech” and “corporate crime.”  
Busy lawyers call the law “a jealous mistress” and call themselves “slaves” to 
their time sheets.  Lawyers “stand” at the bar, on behalf of clients whose cases 
are “live.”  Judges “sit” on these cases and preside over the ritualized “battles” 
of the courtroom, which open with “pleadings” to the judge, followed by the 
ritualized “motions” and “counter-motions” of the opposing parties.  Each 
side then “attacks” the other with “lines of argument” arrayed as if soldiers on 
a march, with one side “winning” and collecting the spoils, the “damages,” 
inflicted on the other.83 
 
 79. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1995); LON 
L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW (1968); see Domingo, Body, Soul, and Spirit of the Law, supra 
note 30, at 231–34. 
 80. See generally Martin E. Marty, The Religious Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 291 (2005) 
(outlining and redefining discussions of the religious dimensions of law). 
 81. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 82. STEVEN L. WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, LIFE, AND MIND 335–36 (2001) (quot-
ing F.W. MAITLAND, EQUITY, ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 296 (1909)). 
 83. See id. at 336–39; Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Gov-
ernance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1410–12 (1988); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Met-
aphoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1220–22; (1989).  See 
generally MARK JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION, 
AND REASONING (1987) (giving an account of how meaning, understanding, and rationality are 
grounded in bodily structures, as opposed to only cognitive ones); GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, 
AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987) (discussing the role 
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As soon as you let your imagination and memory run this way, all kinds 
of structural metaphors of the law come to mind.  Think of trees: the law has 
“roots,” “branches,” “ripe cases,” and specialized “fields.”  Think of rivers: 
we have “streams of commerce,” “downstream effects” of decisions, “water-
shed” cases or statutes, and new laws drawn out of “deep wells.”  Think of 
mountains: we have “high principles” and “lowly precepts”; we have “slip-
pery slopes” and “dangerous passes” that should not be risked.  Think of 
“paths”: Rabbis speak of “the way” or “path of the law” (Halacha), a phrase 
echoed famously by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.84  Think of light: important 
cases are “fixed stars” in the legal “universe,” and important legal tomes and 
codes are the “windows” or “mirrors” (Spiegelen) of law.  And on and on we 
could go. 
Some of these legal metaphors are simply rhetorical tropes or short hands 
to stoke the imagination or to win over the non-lawyer sitting, say, in the jury 
box or the voting booth.  Think of how the “marketplace of ideas” metaphor 
brings alive one version of free speech doctrines or how “the wall of separa-
tion” image captures one ideal of church–state relations.  Sometimes these 
metaphors are “condensed code[s]”85 designed to communicate legal com-
plexity with simplicity and efficiency.  “Having one’s day in court” nicely 
captures a whole array of important legal doctrines and procedures and con-
stitutional rights.  Giving “marital equality” to same-sex partners is a nice 
rhetorical shorthand for a whole body of learning about privacy, equality, au-
tonomy, non-discrimination, and self-determination, as well as about the na-
ture and purposes of marriage itself. 
B. Ontological and Religious Metaphors 
But in law, metaphors are more than linguistic tools and rhetorical tropes.  
They are also designed to help make objective and tangible the deep subjec-
tive ideals and beliefs that we hold dear as legal authorities, legal subjects, 
and legal professionals.  These metaphors help us to create enduring legal or-
der and meaningful legal norms—norms that are understandable, acceptable, 
 
of categorization in the way humans understand the world). 
 84. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 85. See Robert N. Bellah, Marriage in the Matrix of Habit and History, in FAMILY TRANSFORMED: 
RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 21, 23–24 (Steven M. Tipton & John Witte, Jr. 
eds., 2005) (quoting MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS: EXPLORATIONS IN COSMOLOGY 24 
(1982)). 
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commanding of obedience, and enforceable in a community.86  As Robert 
Cover put it in his famous article Nomos and Narrative: 
 Creati[on of] legal meaning . . . requires not only the movement 
of dedication and commitment, but also the objectification of that to 
which one is committed.  The community posits a law, external to 
itself, that it is committed to obeying and that it does obey in dedica-
tion to its understanding of that law.  Objectification is crucial to the 
language games that can be played with the law and to the meanings 
that can be created out of it. . . . 
 Creation of legal meaning entails, then, subjective commitment to 
an objecti[ve] understanding of a demand.  It entails the disengage-
ment of the self from the “object” of law, and at the same time re-
quires an engagement to that object as a faithful “other.”87 
In saying this, Cover “strips lawmaking down to its roots in human thought 
and action,” and “rip[s] away the veil of objectivity and rationality that attends 
the most conventional judicial and academic expositions of the law” as a 
closed system of auto-generated and self-executing rules and procedures.88 
Cover’s insight captures, but goes beyond, the insights of the American 
legal realists in the 1930s and ‘40s, who showed persuasively that judges ren-
der their judgments not merely by formal legal logic and ineluctable legal rea-
soning but just as much in expression of their passions, prejudices, experi-
ences, and ideals.89  It also goes beyond the more cynical charges of various 
critical legal scholars who, since the 1960s, have claimed that law is simply 
an instrument for the rich and powerful to exploit the poor, needy, and vul-
nerable, and to impose coercively on the community their ideals of class, gen-
der, race, religion, economy, social hierarchy, and more.90  For Cover, the re-
alists and “crits” were right to expose the reality that law is not the closed 
 
 86. See generally ROBERT M. COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LAW: THE ESSAYS OF 
ROBERT COVER (Martha L. Minow et al. eds., 1992); Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (discussing the necessary coercive quality of these binding norms). 
 87. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 45 (1983). 
 88. WINTER, supra note 82, at 334. 
 89. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM (William W. Fisher III et al. eds., 1993) (discussing and 
collecting essays from legal realist scholars in the early twentieth century). 
 90. See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998) 
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system of formal rules and procedures that the dominant schools of legal pos-
itivism of their day were teaching law students.  They were right to show that 
beneath the objective patina of the law, beneath its claims of purported neu-
trality and pure rationality, are fundamental subjective beliefs, ideals, and val-
ues, deep ontological metaphors, that for better or worse drive legislation, ad-
judication, and executive administration of the law.  But this reality is a not a 
betrayal of the rule of law.  To the contrary, the law needs that process of 
objectifying the subjective, of reifying certain ideas, values, and beliefs, in 
order to be enduring and effective and to be binding on citizens and officials 
alike. 
The key to the legitimacy of a legal order is for the people and their rulers 
alike to participate consciously in this reality.  They must be aware that the 
purportedly objective rules and procedures of the law are rooted in deeply 
subjective choices, even if those choices remain hidden from day-to-day legal 
and communal life.  They must be aware that these deep subjective choices 
reflect and reify fundamental beliefs and values—deep ontological metaphors, 
about the meanings and measures of authority and liberty, justice and mercy, 
rule and equity, nature and custom, canon and commandment, and more.  
They must be able, when a major crisis and challenge comes, to bring to light 
these fundamental beliefs, to inspect them, and if necessary, to reform them 
or the particular rules and procedures that these beliefs and metaphors once 
inspired.  And the people and their rulers must be aware that these fundamen-
tal beliefs, and the decisions about whether and how to reform them, are situ-
ated in and guided by ongoing communal narratives about the meaning of life 
and reality altogether.  Cover put it memorably: 
We inhabit a nomos—a normative universe.  We constantly create 
and maintain a world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of 
valid and void. . . .  No set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists 
apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.  For every 
constitution, there is an epic, for every decalogue a scripture.  Once 
understood in the context of the narratives that give it meaning, law 
becomes not merely a system of rules to be observed, but a world in 
which we live.91 
 
(collecting essays critiquing law in American society). 
 91. Cover, supra note 87, at 4–5 (footnotes omitted).  For comparative perspectives, see generally 
Lior Barschak, Constituent Power as Body: Outline of a Constitutional Theology, 56 U. TORONTO 
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Metaphor theory, understood this way, has long been a favorite of West-
ern legal historians as they have sought to describe the foundational ideology 
or belief-system of a legal civilization or age and the major forms and norms 
of its predominant legal system.  In recounting the history of the law, these 
historians ask: What are the dominant beliefs and values, myths and meta-
phors that inform this legal system?  What happens to this legal system when 
those myths and metaphors change, especially abruptly through conquest or 
revolution?  The American poet and Harvard Law School graduate Archibald 
MacLeish captured this notion in his poem The Metaphor: 
A[] [legal] age becomes an age, all else beside, 
When sensuous poets in their pride invent, 
Emblems for the soul’s content. 
That speak the meanings men will never know 
But man-imagined images can show: 
It perishes when those images, though seen, 
No longer mean.92 
Harold J. Berman offers a splendid example of viewing the history of 
Western law through shifts in its ontological metaphors, or its founding “be-
lief system[s],” as he called them.93  There is a distinct Western legal tradition, 
Berman argues, a set of legal ideas and institutions that has evolved by accre-
tion and adaptation over the centuries.94  Six great revolutions, however, have 
punctuated its gradual evolution: the Papal Revolution of 1075; the German 
Lutheran Revolution of 1517; the English Puritan Revolution of 1640; and the 
American, French, and Russian Revolutions of 1776, 1789, and 1917.95  These 
revolutions were, in part, rebellions against a legal and political order that had 
 
L.J., 185 (2006); Kjell Ǻ Modéer, Lebende Ruinen des Rechts: Rechtliche Metaphern in postkoloni-
alen und spätmodernen Rechtskulturdiskursen [Living Ruins of the Law: Legal Metaphors in Post-
colonial and Late-Modern Legal Culture Discourses], 19 RECHTSGESCHICHTE [RG] 228 (2011) 
(Ger.); and elaboration in LAW & RELIGION IN THE 21ST CENTURY: NORDIC PERSPECTIVES (Lisbet 
Christoffersen et al. eds., 2010). 
 92. Archibald MacLeish, The Metaphor, in HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE 
FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION v (1983). 
 93. Id. at 36; HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION II: THE IMPACT OF THE PROTESTANT 
REFORMATIONS ON THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 10, 11, 23 (2003).  These next two paragraphs 
are adapted from WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 6–8. 
 94. BERMAN, supra note 93, at 6; WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 6. 
 95. Id. 
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become outmoded and ossified, arbitrary and abusive.  But, more fundamen-
tally, these revolutions were products of radical shifts in the founding meta-
phors, in the dominant belief-systems of the people. 
Each of these new belief systems offered a new eschatology and a new 
apocalyptic vision of the perfect end-time, whether it was the second coming 
of Christ, the arrival of the heavenly city of the Enlightenment philosophers, 
or the withering away of the state.  Each of these revolutions triggered massive 
changes in prevailing legal forms and norms—movements from canon law to 
civil law to common law, from the supremacy of the church to the supremacy 
of the state, to the supremacy of the individual or the collective.  Each of these 
revolutions, in its radical phase, sought the death of an old legal order to bring 
forth a new order that would survive its understanding of the Last Judgment.  
Eventually, each of these revolutions settled down and introduced fundamen-
tal legal changes that were ultimately subsumed in and accommodated to the 
Western legal tradition.  Today, Berman concludes, this Western legal tradi-
tion has been drawn into increasing cooperation and competition with other 
legal traditions from around the globe, in the struggle to define a new common 
law, a new legal language for the emerging world order.96 
Berman’s account of law and religion in Western history built on earlier 
European scholarship.  Nineteenth-century German jurists Friedrich Carl von 
Savigny and Otto von Gierke, for example, offered a quite different account 
of Western legal history based on shifting images of the individual and the 
collective, the Volk and the Volksgeist, and the citizen and the association 
(Genossenschaft).97  English legal historian Sir Henry Maine depicted millen-
nium-long shifts in the Western legal tradition from status to contract, from 
 
 96. See BERMAN, supra note 93, at 7; WITTE, GOD’S JOUST, GOD’S JUSTICE, supra note 29, at 7.  
See generally BERMAN, supra note 70 (arguing that law and religion inevitably do and should interact 
to incorporate public beliefs into social and legal systems); HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION 
OF LAW AND RELIGION 47 (1974).  See also literature in HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND LANGUAGE: 
EFFECTIVE SYMBOLS OF COMMUNITY (John Witte, Jr., ed. 2013) (discussing the role of legal language 
in creating harmony within the local and international communities) [hereinafter BERMAN, LAW AND 
LANGUAGE].  See analysis in Lior Barshack, The Communal Body, the Corporate Body, and the Cler-
ical Body: An Anthropological Reading of the Gregorian Reform, in SACRED AND SECULAR IN 
MEDIEVAL AND EARLY MODERN CULTURES: NEW ESSAYS 101, 101–21 (Lawrence Besserman ed., 
2006); THE INTEGRATIVE JURISPRUDENCE OF HAROLD J. BERMAN (Howard O. Hunter ed., 1996); 
Harold J. Berman, The Historical Foundations of Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 1 (2005). 
 97. See OTTO VON GIERKE, DAS DEUTSCHEN GENOSSENSCHAFTSRECHT [THE GERMAN LAW OF 
ASSOCIATIONS: BD. LEGAL HISTORY OF GERMAN ASSOCIATIONS] (Akademische Druck- und Verlag-
sanstalt eds., 1954). 
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equity to legislation, from custom to code.98  Dutch philosopher Herman 
Dooyeweerd analyzed the founding and grounding “religious motifs” or met-
aphors of each age—the motifs of Greek “form and matter,” Catholic “grace 
and nature,” Protestant “creation, fall, and redemption,” and Enlightenment 
“nature and freedom”—and the concrete manifestations of these shifting mo-
tifs in legal, political, and cultural life.99 
Legal scholars have used metaphor theory not only to describe the found-
ing metaphors or beliefs of whole legal systems in different historical eras, 
but also to describe discrete bodies of law in operation today.  Constitutional 
law is a favorite for metaphorical treatment.  A number of legal scholars have 
shown that, for many Americans, constitutionalism is a fundamental cultural 
activity that sometimes takes on overt religious qualities.100  The Constitution 
is thus viewed as a sacred national document, secured in a national shrine, 
celebrated in national holidays and exhibitions, and confirmed in solemn oaths 
and pledges of allegiance.  The text of the Constitution is authoritative in it-
self, a canon whose exact meaning remains the subject of endless debate and 
development.101  The writings of the founding fathers who created and ratified 
this document are also authoritative—like Prophets expounding the Torah, or 
Epistles glossing the Gospels.  The judges who interpret the Constitution are 
 
 98. See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (Transaction, 2001) (1861); HENRY SUMNER 
MAINE, DISSERTATIONS ON EARLY LAW AND CUSTOM (Batoche, 1999) (1883); HENRY SUMNER 
MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS [1875] (Batoche, 1999) (1875); HENRY 
SUMNER MAINE, VILLAGE COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND THE WEST (Arno, 1974) (1871). 
 99. See HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, DE WIJSBEGEERTE DER WETSIDEE [THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
LAW IDEA] (1935–1936); HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ENCYCLOPAEDIE DER RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT 
[ENCYCLOPEDIA OF JURISPRUDENCE] (1946); HERMAN DOOYEWEERD, ROOTS OF WESTERN 
CULTURE: PAGAN, SECULAR, AND CHRISTIAN OPTIONS (M. Vander Vennen & B. Zylstra eds., J. 
Kraay trans., 1979). 
 100. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, POLITICAL THEOLOGY: FOUR NEW CHAPTERS IN THE CONCEPT 
OF SOVEREIGNTY 158 (2011) (“A political theory that fails to see that politics treads deeply on the 
theological will . . . always be . . . unprepared for the violence of politics.”); PAUL W. KAHN, THE 
CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999) (studying the cultural, 
rather than normative, dimensions of law); LEGAL CANONS (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 
2000); SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (rev. ed. 2011); W. Tarver Rountree, Jr., Con-
stitutionalism as the American Religion: The Good Portion, 39 EMORY L.J. 203, 203 (1990) (“Con-
stitutionalism is the American religion.”). 
 101. LEGAL CANONS, supra note 100, at 331 (concluding that constitutional “interpretation is una-
voidable” and “[c]ertain parts of the text of the Constitution, and other derivative texts, are ‘canoni-
cal’” to constitutional argument). 
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secular priests, who, after enduring long passages of ordination and confirma-
tion, utter solemn public oaths to uphold the Constitution.  Like priests stand-
ing at their high pulpits expounding the biblical commandment to “love thy 
neighbor as thyself,”102 judges sit on their raised benches expounding the con-
stitutional commandment to give “due process” and “equal protection”103 to 
all.  Like congregants in the church, citizens of the state study these priestly 
interpretations of their authoritative text, debating their veracity, their utility, 
their allegiance to the original and evolving meaning of the canon. 
It is easy to get lofty like this in describing the quasi-religious ontological 
and structural metaphors of constitutional law, since this topic morphs into 
some of the quasi-religious political metaphors that we sampled above.  But 
other legal subjects—criminal law, torts, contracts, bankruptcy, evidence, cor-
porations, environmental law, human rights law, and the like—have equally 
profound, albeit usually more prosaic, beliefs, values, and ideals that shape 
them.  Deep notions of fault and responsibility are at work in torts and criminal 
law.  The meaning of promises, faithfulness, and reliability animates the law 
of contracts.  Redemption and forgiveness are at the core of bankruptcy law.  
Testimony and truth-seeking are at the heart of evidence law.  Profit and ac-
countability are among the founding beliefs of corporate law.  Nature and its 
preservation are at the core of modern environmental law.  Human dignity and 
its protection are at the foundation of modern human rights law.104  The found-
ing norms and beliefs of these legal specialties may not be as grandly ritual-
ized and celebrated as those of constitutional law—although environmental 
law and human rights do sometimes inspire marches and demonstrations, can-
ons and declarations, and platforms and associations that attract large numbers 
of spirited devotees.105  But, even if not, the ontological metaphors—and the 
deeper values and beliefs to which they point—in many specialized areas of 
law today remain deeply held, fervently believed, and reflexively imple-
mented.  In that sense, they are what I have called quasi-religious metaphors. 
 
 102. Matthew 22:39 (King James Version). 
 103. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. 
 104. See generally CHRISTIANITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & 
Frank S. Alexander eds., 2010) (providing examples of how modern human rights laws operate to 
protect human dignity). 
 105. See generally id.; RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTRODUCTION (John Witte, Jr. & M. 
Christian Green eds., 2012) (giving examples of how human rights issues draw a lot of support). 
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IV. “TRINITARIAN” METAPHORS IN THE STUDY OF LAW? 
And now let me hazard a speculative idea, which I put as a genuinely open 
query: Could the (quasi-)religious dimensions of metaphors in law also be 
reflected in part in the prevalent use of numbers that are considered special or 
even sacred in a culture?  Nearly half a millennium ago, the great English 
jurist Sir Edward Coke took note of how often the “sacred number twelve” 
came up in the law, beginning with the “Twelve Tables” of ancient Roman 
law: 
[I]t seemeth to me, that the law in this case delighteth herselfe in the 
number of twelve.  For there must not onely be 12 jurors for the tryall 
of matters of fact, but 12 judges of ancient time for the tryall of mat-
ters of law in the Exchequer Chamber.  Also for matters of State there 
were in ancient time twelve Counsellors of State.  He that wageth his 
law, must have eleven others with him, which thinke he says true.  
And that number of twelve is much respected in holy writ, as 12 apos-
tles, 12 stones, 12 tribes, etc.106 
A number of scholars have also pointed to the “special mystical value” 
attached to the number “three” in ancient systems of belief and law.  “To many 
of the leading nations of antiquity it represented divine power,” writes leading 
Roman law historian Henry Goudy in a fascinating older study on Trichotomy 
in Roman Law:107 
As evidence of this it is enough to refer to the three Gods of Hindu 
mythology—Vishnu, Siva, and Brahma, and the Trinity of Christian 
doctrine.  By some ancient philosophers, [three] . . . was regarded as 
the most symbolic of numbers, because it represented the beginning, 
middle, and end of all things, and also the dimensions of space.108 
 This appetite for triads appears similarly in numerous ancient legal doc-
trines. Goudy explores a score of them at the heart of Roman law: the division 
 
 106. I EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND bk. 2, ch. 
12, § 234 (The Legal Classics Library 1985) (rev. 1853). 
 107. HENRY GOUDY, TRICHOTOMY IN ROMAN LAW 8 (1910). 
 108. Id. at 8–10 (footnote omitted). 
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of all law into “jus naturale, jus gentium, and jus civile”;109 the main division 
of civil law into actions, persons, and things; the aphorism that all laws are 
concerned with the acquisition, conservation, and restriction of rights; the di-
vision of legal persons into liberi, servi, et libertini; the three marks of justice 
being “honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, [and] suum cuique tribuere”;110 
the three forms of government as monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy; and 
much more.  This appetite for triads persists in many more recent legal doc-
trines, too.111  Modern jurists speak regularly of life, liberty, and property; 
liberté, égalité, et fraternité; three generations of human rights; three purposes 
of punishment, retribution, deterrence, and rehabilitation; three forms of legal 
power, executive, legislative, and judicial; three purposes of legislation, 
health, safety, and welfare; the body, soul, and spirit of the law, and more.  
Some jurists strive to integrate the three civil, theological, and educational 
uses of the law and the three legal schools of natural law, legal positivism, and 
historical jurisprudence. 
So, why the persistence of the number “three” as we think both function-
ally and foundationally about the law and our human interaction with it?  Is 
“three” just an easy trope for presentation and memory?  Is it simply an or-
ganizational or orientation metaphor?  Does it merely connote the sense of 
aesthetic balance that we three-dimensional human beings crave?  Is it just 
akin to what gardeners tell us about planting flowers, trees, and bushes—that 
clusters of three together are usually seen as the most harmonious and bal-
anced?  Maybe that is all that is involved here. 
But, the Trinitarian Christian in me wonders whether there is a view 
“from the church to the courthouse” (to use Professor Cochran’s opening met-
aphor from Tom Schaffer) that suggests a deeper source for the use of these 
triads in law, as in life.112  In our creeds and confessions, we say that it was 
the Triune God who announced at creation: “Let us make man in our image, 
after our likeness.”113  As image-bearers of God, humans bear God’s triune 
image.  We reflect these Trinitarian views in our anthropologies of body, soul, 
and spirit; of reason, will, and memory; of prophet, priest, and king; of faith, 
hope, and love.  Perhaps we also reflect these Trinitarian views in the laws 
 
 109. Id. at 20. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. at 20–72. 
 112. See FAITH & LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW 
AMERICAN LAW 1 (Robert F. Cochran, Jr. ed., 2008). 
 113. Genesis 1:26. 
[Vol. 47: 435, 2020] The Metaphorical Bridge 
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW 
461 
 
that we create, rooted as they ultimately are in the law of the Triune God who 
has written the laws on our hearts.  Perhaps St. Paul’s metaphor of the “body, 
soul, and spirit”114 is useful not only for describing our integral human nature 
but also an integrative jurisprudence.  Perhaps the Bible’s account of a triune 
God who creates order from chaos, offers redemption to wrongdoers, and lets 
“[justice] roll down like waters, and righteousness like a mighty stream”115 
helps guide the fundamental creative, redemptive, and justice-seeking duties 
of the Christian lawyer. 
These are rather grand metaphorical speculations that don’t fit neatly into 
our modern teachings on law or the legal profession.  Most lawyers would 
find more congenial the common metaphors of the lawyer as “Godfather,” 
“hired gun,” “guru,” “friend,” or “Nostromo” that Professor Cochran has 
lifted up.  The metaphor of the lawyer as a “Trinitarian Christian Jurist” will 
appear foreign to most.  Some might even be tempted to turn Martin Luther’s 
famous quip, “Juristen, böse Christen”116 onto its head: not only are lawyers 
bad Christians, as Luther charged, but Christians are bad lawyers, too.  Yet 
these speculations, inspired in part by Professor Cochran’s path-breaking 
scholarship, might be worth more consideration.  I want to try to think and 
work through them in the years ahead, hopefully in conversation if not collab-
oration with Professor Cochran and with scholars like Rafael Domingo and 
David McIlroy who have started to write in this vein.117  This would be a rather 
new way of thinking about law and religion, and more specifically about law 
and Christianity.  At the very least, it would provide an interesting view of the 
courthouse from the church “across the street.”118  And such thoughts might 
just inspire lawyers within and beyond the church to think anew about their 
classic calling to be “servants of the law who labor with learning, courage, 
and devotion to preserve liberty and promote justice.”119 
  
 
 114. See Thessalonians 5:23. 
 115. Amos 5:24. 
 116. 2 MARTIN LUTHER, TISCHREDEN [TABLE TALK] 219 (Weimar: Böhlau ed. 1912). 
 117. See Domingo, supra note 30; DAVID MCILROY, A TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY OF LAW (rev. ed. 
2019). 
 118. See FAITH & LAW: HOW RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS FROM CALVINISM TO ISLAM VIEW 
AMERICAN LAW, supra note 11, at 1. 
 119. Cochran, supra note 25, at i. 
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